Hello everyone, welcome to Er Ye’s Story. Just yesterday, the British Financial Times broke a shocking piece of news: China’s Minister of National Defense, Dong Jun, is under investigation for alleged corruption. Moreover, the Financial Times also revealed that Xi Jinping is expanding the anti-corruption investigation within the People’s Liberation Army, and Dong Jun is just one of the targets of the investigation.
The shocking part of this news is that just a week ago, Dong Jun attended the Asian Defense Conference held in Laos. At this conference, Dong Jun refused to meet with U.S. Secretary of Defense Austin, expressing his dissatisfaction with the U.S. starting arms sales to Taiwan. It’s only been a week, and news of his downfall has emerged, which is truly unbelievable.
When asked about this rumor at a regular press conference, Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesperson Mao Ning responded with four words: “Catching shadows and grasping at the wind.” The British Financial Times reported that there is a possibility that China’s Minister of National Defense, Dong Jun, is being investigated for corruption. What is the spokesperson’s response to this? Catching shadows and grasping at the wind.
In fact, many rumors about the high-level officials of the CCP have been proven to be prophecies that were far ahead of their time. The Financial Times is a well-established newspaper in the UK, founded in 1888. It’s not the kind of tabloid that focuses on attracting attention, and it should have its own sources. The Financial Times itself revealed that its source is a current official from the U.S. Department of Defense.
Regardless of whether this news is true or false, in short, the matter of the Minister of National Defense being investigated is not new to us. In these short two years, we have already heard about it three times. In August 2023, Li Shangfu, who had only been the Minister of National Defense for seven months, was investigated. In June 2024, he was expelled from the Party and the military, his rank of General of the Army was revoked, and he was transferred to judicial proceedings.
One month after Li Shangfu was investigated, that is, in September 2023, his predecessor, Wei Fenghe, who had just retired not long ago, was also investigated, and along with Li Shangfu, he was expelled from the Party and the military, his rank of General of the Rocket Force was revoked, and he was transferred to judicial proceedings.
The current Minister of National Defense, Dong Jun, was once the commander of the Navy and a Navy General. He took office last December, replacing Li Shangfu. Unexpectedly, it hasn’t even been a year, and he’s been investigated again.
The current Minister of National Defense, Dong Jun, was once the commander of the Navy and a Navy General. He took office last December, replacing Li Shangfu. Unexpectedly, it hasn’t even been a year, and he’s been investigated again.
Three consecutive Ministers of National Defense being investigated in a short two years, this is also a first in the long history of the CCP’s power struggles, like a young woman getting married. It’s very, very rare. So what kind of problem is it that makes Xi Jinping not hesitate to slap himself in the face and take down the Ministers of National Defense he promoted one after another? How did the position of Minister of National Defense become a high-risk profession?
Before talking about Dong Jun being investigated, I’ll briefly introduce the special position of the CCP’s Minister of National Defense. I mentioned in the previous program that there are three departments in the CCP’s government system whose status is very special because their functions are very important. Their ministers, according to convention, will concurrently serve as State Councilors, who are officials at the vice-national level. Their appointments often need the approval of the General Secretary. These three ministers are from the Ministry of Public Security, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and the Ministry of National Defense. And among these three departments, the Ministry of National Defense is the most special of all. It is the only department in the State Council that has a ministerial title but does not have an actual organizational setup. Most of its functions are implemented by the relevant institutions of the Central Military Commission. The Ministry of National Defense only has a registration number in the State Council’s system. Moreover, the Ministry of National Defense today has no deputy ministers, only one minister. Why is this? This is related to the CCP’s military system.
As we all know, in most countries in the world, the military belongs to the state, the so-called nationalization of the military, and it does not belong to any political party. The president or prime minister who comes to power through elections will concurrently serve as the commander-in-chief of the military. But the CCP is different. It has always been the Party commanding the gun, and the military completely trusts the Party. The so-called People’s Liberation Army is actually the CCP’s Party Guard Army, and its nature and function are exactly the same as the Nazi Party Guard Army. Therefore, the organization and command of the People’s Liberation Army have always been the responsibility of the Party’s Military Commission. The government cannot interfere at all.
However, this system, at the national level, will cause many things to be unreasonable. For example, the military’s budget, conscription, foreign exchanges, retirement security, and the compensation for martyrs, even some functions involving local affairs, if the government does not participate, then the military cannot independently complete them. And the military, in name, cannot be above the government, which represents the entire country. Therefore, the People’s Liberation Army must, like other countries, set up a Ministry of National Defense within the government to handle a series of affairs related to the government. And the Minister of National Defense is a pivotal position connecting the military and the government. He is not only the military’s representative in the government, but also the military’s spokesperson to the outside world. It seems that there is nothing to do in the government system, but it is indispensable and very important.
In the “Resolution on Changing the Organizational System” passed by the CCP in July 1958, it was stipulated that the Ministry of National Defense is the external name of the Central Military Commission. Matters decided by the Military Commission, which are approved by the State Council or need to be issued in the name of the administration, shall be signed by the Minister of National Defense. Therefore, since the CCP established the Ministry of National Defense in 1954, the successive Ministers of National Defense have all held multiple positions and were important figures. Within the military, they are generally vice-chairmen of the Military Commission, within the Party, they are generally members of the Politburo, and within the government, they even long served as vice-premiers. For example, the first Peng Dehuai, the second Lin Biao, the third Ye Jianying, the fourth Xu Xiangqian, the fifth Geng Biao, and the sixth Zhang Aiping, these people were all heavyweight figures who actually controlled military power.
After the reform and opening up, Deng Xiaoping firmly grasped military power, and the position of Minister of National Defense declined somewhat. In 1982, the State Council established the position of State Councilor, which is at the vice-national level. Starting from the 7th Minister of National Defense, Qin Jiwei, he no longer concurrently served as vice-premier and member of the Politburo, but concurrently served as State Councilor. Starting from the 10th Minister of National Defense, Liang Guanglie, he was no longer the vice-chairman of the Military Commission, but was held by an ordinary member of the Military Commission. Although the position of Minister of National Defense declined in the Party and the military, this position is still an important position spanning the Party, the government, and the military, so its status is still very critical. In the leadership of the People’s Liberation Army, it is second only to the chairman and vice-chairmen of the Military Commission. It can be seen that for a considerable period of history, the CCP’s Minister of National Defense, as the representative of the People’s Liberation Army to the outside world, is not a nominal position. The power may not be high, but the position has always been very important, and it is not the same as an ordinary government minister.
Because it is so important, the person who takes this position must be approved by the top leader. But this position is not a good job. After Xi Jinping came to power, in order to establish his authority, in addition to purging his political opponents, the more critical thing was to grasp the gun. Because in the history of the CCP’s power struggles, whoever grasps the gun often has the last laugh.
Like Mao Zedong, he could not be the President of the State, but he was always the Chairman of the Military Commission until his death, and he never let go of military power for a lifetime. For example, Deng Xiaoping, for most of the time after the reform and opening up, he had neither administrative positions nor Party positions, and he was not even a member of the Politburo after 1987, but he was always the Chairman of the Military Commission until after the June Fourth Incident in 1989, and even after retirement, he controlled military power remotely through the Yang Shangkun brothers. It can be seen how important military power is to the CCP leaders.
After Xi Jinping came to power, in order to centralize power, he brought the way of governing the country through small groups to the extreme, that is, he established all kinds of small groups, acted as the leader himself, and placed his confidants in these small groups to control real power. Through the leading groups that are above the actual functional departments, he hollowed out the power of the departments and achieved the goal of centralizing power. This move was immediately effective in the government system, and it quickly hollowed out Li Keqiang’s State Council, causing Li Keqiang to wear small shoes for 10 years in frustration.
Within the military, Xi Jinping also followed suit and centralized power through small groups. In March 2014, Xi Jinping established a military reform group, and Xi Jinping himself served as the leader. Xi Jinping adopted four axes to control military power.
The first axe is to adjust the original three services of the People’s Liberation Army, the Army, Navy, and Air Force, and add two major services, the Rocket Force and the Strategic Support Force. These two new services originally belonged to the Army. Since the CCP was established, the Army has been the most important service and has always been the elder brother of the People’s Liberation Army. Xi Jinping’s first axe is actually to weaken the Army and avoid one family dominating.
Xi Jinping’s second axe is to split the four powerful departments of the Central Military Commission, namely the General Logistics Department, the General Staff Department, the General Political Department, and the General Equipment Department. Xi Jinping re-split these departments into 15 independent departments, dispersing and weakening the power of the departments. At the same time, he established various leading groups or committees of the Military Commission above these departments. For example, in order to control the most core power of personnel appointments, he established the Military Commission Cadre Review Committee, and let Peng Liyuan serve as a senior review committee member, which is equivalent to directly taking the personnel power that originally belonged to the General Political Department into his own hands.
Xi Jinping’s third axe is to re-divide the theater commands. After Deng Xiaoping’s large-scale downsizing of the military in 1985, the seven major military regions were formed. These military regions were relatively independent and were equivalent to vassals within the military, holding considerable real power. Xi Jinping re-divided and combined the seven major military regions, integrating them into five theater commands in the east, west, south, north, and center. At the same time, the original 18 group armies of the People’s Liberation Army were also completely broken up and re-integrated into 13 group armies. This move was even more ruthless than Mao Zedong’s exchange of military region commanders back then. He was to completely disrupt the original affiliation of the military and eliminate the mountain-top forces.
Xi Jinping’s fourth axe is the anti-corruption that we are familiar with. This move Xi Jinping played with consummate skill. Within Xi Jinping’s first five-year term alone, he continuously purged the high-level officials of the military through the Central Commission for Discipline Inspection. More than 4,000 people in the entire People’s Liberation Army were investigated, 13,000 people were disciplined, and at least 69 tigers above the military level fell from grace, involving various services and departments, including Xu Caihou and Guo Boxiong, the vice-chairmen of the Military Commission who were once under one person and above ten thousand people, as well as Zhang Yang and Fang Fenghui, these big military heads. This kind of cleansing has continued to this day, and the military is in a state of self-preservation.
Xi Jinping himself only has a few months of military experience, and it’s still very勉强, that is, he served as the secretary of the Military Commission Secretary-General Geng Biao. Before he came to power, he had no power of his own within the military. The CCP’s military is a self-contained system. Generally, senior generals have been in the military for decades, and they have their own intricate forces within the military, which are usually difficult to shake.
Xi Jinping’s predecessor, Hu Jintao, was the chairman of the Military Commission for 10 years, but in fact, he never really controlled military power, and he was completely hollowed out by Xu Caihou, Guo Boxiong, and others during the Jiang Zemin era. This is also the main reason why Hu Jintao was a weak leader for 10 years. He couldn’t command the gun, and he always lacked confidence, and at critical moments, he could only seek a balance.
Although Xi Jinping is a mess in governing the country and ensuring national security, he has to say that he is much more shrewd than Hu Jintao in controlling power. He has thoroughly understood the Achilles’ heel of the CCP’s power system, and his actions are steady, accurate, and ruthless. He used the name of military reform and, through the four axes I mentioned earlier, carried out a major reshuffle of the military’s leadership and management system. All the high-level positions within the military were replaced, and the forces of the CCP’s major military heads were gradually dispersed and reorganized, achieving the goal of weakening or even disintegrating them. Finally, in the process of re-integration, he firmly controlled military power by promoting and placing his own confidants.
Those senior generals promoted during the Jiang Zemin and Hu Jintao eras, in Xi Jinping’s military reform, those who were lucky could retire with honor, and those who were unlucky would go to jail. The rest were either Xi Jinping’s confidants or those who expressed their loyalty in a timely manner. It can be said that after these more than ten years of cleansing and integration, the current People’s Liberation Army is actually the Xi family army from top to bottom.
Going back to the beginning, we talked about the fallen Ministers of National Defense. These people are actually different from those military heads who fell from grace a few years ago. Many of those people were purged by Xi Jinping for the purpose of weakening the vassal states, and they were not people he promoted himself, so of course they couldn’t be kept for the New Year. But these three recent Ministers of National Defense, Wei Fenghe, Li Shangfu, and Dong Jun, were all promoted by Xi Jinping himself.
For example, Wei Fenghe, he was the first general promoted by Xi Jinping about a week after he came to power in November 2012. Xi Jinping presided over the ceremony in the Beijing Military Commission building and specially arranged a general rank awarding ceremony for Wei Fenghe alone, which can be said to be very favored. At the end of 2015, the Rocket Force was established, and Xi Jinping promoted Wei Fenghe to be the first commander of the Rocket Force.
Li Shangfu is a second-generation red, and his father was an old Red Army soldier, Li Shaozhu, the deputy commander of the Southwest Command of the former People’s Liberation Army Railway Corps. In January 2016, the Strategic Support Force was established, and Xi Jinping promoted him to be the deputy commander and chief of staff, and then quickly promoted Li Shangfu to be the minister of the Equipment Development Department of the Military Commission. In October 2022, he also became a member of the Central Military Commission, which is a senior general second only to the two vice-chairmen.
The current Minister of National Defense, Dong Jun, is the same. His military career has always been in the Navy. In August 2021, he was promoted by Xi Jinping to be the commander of the Navy. In 2023, he replaced the fallen Li Shangfu and became the Minister of National Defense. He is the first Minister of National Defense from the Navy.
These three people are absolutely authentic Xi family army. Why does Xi Jinping still want to purge them in the name of anti-corruption? Let’s briefly review the reasons for the fall of the previous two Ministers of National Defense, Wei Fenghe and Li Shangfu. Their falls were only a month apart, with Li Shangfu in front and Wei Fenghe behind. According to the announcement released by the CCP’s official media Xinhua Net, the reasons for the fall of the two people are almost the same, that is, they seriously violated political discipline and organizational discipline, violated regulations to seek personnel benefits for others, accepted gifts and large sums of money, and were suspected of bribery, etc. These standardized and formalized statements obviously cannot read the details of their fall. But we can see an outline.
After Li Shangfu fell from grace at the end of July 2023, the Central Military Commission issued an announcement on soliciting clues about violations of regulations and discipline by experts in the procurement and bidding review of the entire army, soliciting clues about problems of violations of regulations and discipline in procurement since October 2017. And the time point of October 2017 is exactly when Li Shangfu took office as the minister of the Equipment Development Department of the Military Commission. Therefore, from the content of this announcement, it can be confirmed that Li Shangfu fell from grace because he lined his own pockets in the procurement and bidding of military equipment.
So how was this matter exposed? In August 2021, Wu Yansheng, the chairman of China Aerospace Science and Technology Corporation, was anonymously reported by his subordinates on the Internet, saying that he violated regulations in employing people and engaged in corruption and bribery. This matter quickly triggered a wave of storms on the Internet, leading to Wu Yansheng being investigated. As a result, pulling out the radish brought out the mud, and a large number of high-level officials of military-industrial state-owned enterprises were quickly implicated, triggering a series of earthquakes. Among them were Liu Shiquan, the chairman of China North Industries Group Corporation, Yuan Jie, the chairman of China Aerospace Science and Industry Corporation, Chen Guoying, the general manager of China Ordnance Equipment Group, etc. Everyone knows that these military-industrial enterprises of the CCP are very deep, holding huge orders for national military procurement, cutting corners, bidding in violation of regulations, and lining their own pockets are all common occurrences. And the targets of these people’s bribery cannot avoid the superior department in charge of procurement, the Equipment Development Department of the Military Commission. And the minister at that time was Li Shangfu. Therefore, the fall of the senior executives of military-industrial state-owned enterprises quickly implicated Li Shangfu.
How much money Li Shangfu actually received has not been announced yet, but the amount will definitely not be small, otherwise Xi Jinping would not be so furious. Xi Jinping may not have expected that the Minister of National Defense he had just promoted had such a dirty bottom, so he quickly took down Li Shangfu.
After Li Shangfu fell from grace, he may have also confessed Wei Fenghe. Because in the process of Li Shangfu’s promotion, he did not eat alone, and he also sent out a lot of money. Being able to become the Minister of National Defense is very likely also due to the recommendation of his predecessor, Wei Fenghe. Of course, there is another version of the rumor about Wei Fenghe’s fall, that is, it is related to the leak of the Rocket Force. Before Wei Fenghe served as the Minister of National Defense, he was the commander of the Rocket Force. His successor was Li Yuchao, and Li Yuchao’s son once studied in the United States, and it is said that he was suspected of selling the CCP’s military intelligence. What intelligence? Speaking of which, we have to blame the U.S. The China Aerospace Research Institute, an organization under the U.S. Air Force University, published a 255-page report on the organizational structure of the CCP’s Rocket Force on October 24, 2022, which provided a detailed disclosure of the high-level officials of the Rocket Force, from the command system to the logistics base. The specific information even includes the addresses of the bases, the main functions of the troops, the Chinese and English names of the responsible persons, and the numbers of the troops, etc. Not only that, this report also marked the deployment of the Rocket Force across the country on the map of China in detail, and also showed the photos, names, and relationships of the main responsible persons of each department of the Rocket Force. Even the logistics information such as the mess halls, dog-raising stations, and sanatoriums in the military are all available. This major leak of military secrets can be said to have severely slapped the CCP military in the face. Therefore, it is not surprising that Xi Jinping was furious and investigated. Subsequently, starting from March 2023, the high-level officials of the Rocket Force were subjected to a rare large-scale cleansing, and the three former commanders, two deputy commanders, and several cadres at the military and division levels all fell from grace. This matter is also very likely to be an important reason that implicated Wei Fenghe.
Regardless of the rumors, it can be confirmed that the fall of the previous two Ministers of National Defense, Wei Fenghe and Li Shangfu, was indeed directly related to corruption. So now that Dong Jun is also rumored to have fallen from grace, is it also related to corruption? In fact, before Dong Jun took office, there were some unusual signs. I said earlier that the Minister of National Defense will generally also serve as a member of the CCP’s Military Commission and a State Councilor. But after Dong Jun became the Minister of National Defense, he was not promoted to be a member of the Military Commission. In the government reshuffle in March last year, Dong Jun was also not appointed as a State Councilor. This very abnormal sign shows that Xi Jinping, after the previous two Ministers of National Defense had problems, and also in the case that Foreign Minister Qin Gang also had problems, he obviously kept a hand and had doubts about the newly promoted people.
We all know that the high-level officials of the CCP’s totalitarian system, especially the high-ranking officials within the military, it is almost impossible for them to be clean. In the process of climbing to the top of the pyramid, in addition to choosing sides and personal dependence, sending money for promotion is almost an open unspoken rule. Everyone wants to join, so who do you choose? Of course, the priority is to choose those who have real interests. And where does the money of these people come from? It can only come from corruption. While corrupting money, they also send money, so that they can achieve breakthroughs in their official careers in the system of reverse elimination. Xi Jinping also certainly knows this, so anti-corruption is just an imperial technique that he often uses to exclude dissidents and warn his subordinates. He also knows that there are definitely no completely clean officials.
But why is Xi Jinping so concerned about the corruption of the high-level officials of the military? Xi Jinping, as we all know, one of his very typical character traits is that he is ambitious but lacks talent. Many of the grand and seemingly absurd slogans he has put forward since he came to power are not actually deceiving people, but he may really think so. As for whether it can be done, that is not within his consideration.
In these grand blueprints about the great rejuvenation and the great struggle, unifying China is a very important part. This dream is not only Xi Jinping’s. The CCP’s leaders of all generations have always been troubled by the existence of Taiwan. Especially after Taiwan realized democratization, the comparison of the systems on both sides of the strait has become a huge crisis for the CCP’s legitimacy in power. Unifying Taiwan has also become a real need. Especially after the Democratic Progressive Party came to power, the emotional ties between the two sides of the strait were torn apart, the confrontation intensified, and they drifted further and further apart, which has made the CCP have such plans and determination to achieve the blueprint of unification.
And Xi Jinping has been in power for more than ten years, and he has almost nothing to show for it. He has made the country a mess, development has stagnated, the economy is facing unprecedented difficulties, and its international status is also worse than before. Under this big background of being enemies with the West, he can only be brothers with Russia, Iran, and North Korea, these friends of a feather. In this kind of predicament, a person like Xi Jinping has a strong motivation to launch a local war and do some so-called great things. And unifying Taiwan is undoubtedly the best goal for him in his next term as emperor. If he, Xi Jinping, achieves what the previous leaders have not achieved, then it will be in line with his desire to become an emperor for all ages.
Therefore, Xi Jinping has spared no effort to carry out military reform and cleansing, and has continuously increased investment in the military. In fact, in addition to the need to centralize power, the more important thing may be his dream of unification. In this case, Xi Jinping’s expectations and requirements for the military may be higher and more than his requirements for administrative officials. A corrupt military cannot have combat effectiveness. Xi Jinping understands this simple truth. So when he found that these military generals he had high hopes for were, like administrative officials, all greedy for power and money, the disappointment and anger were imaginable. The old man still expects you to charge forward and unify the country, but as a result, you are all scrambling for profit, and you don’t want to fight for the dream of the great leader.
So I personally guess that it is based on this kind of psychology that Xi Jinping will continue to cleanse these military heads he has promoted. This kind of psychology is very similar to the end of the Chongzhen Emperor. Under the predicament of the Chongzhen Emperor facing the two-pronged attack of Li Zicheng and the Manchus, he was eager for success, and his suspicion of military generals was very heavy. He often ignored the objective reality, and if there was a little mistake or dissatisfaction, he would throw them into jail or even behead them. During the 17 years of Chongzhen’s reign, he changed 19 prime ministers of the cabinet and also changed 14 ministers of the Ministry of War. The Minister of the Ministry of War is the current Minister of National Defense, and among them, seven Ministers of the Ministry of War were killed by him. The most famous one is the famous general Yuan Chonghuan. It’s not that the emperor is incompetent, it’s all you treacherous officials who have misled me. In the end, no one dared to work, because if you don’t do well, you will die, and if you do well, you may also die.
Of course, Chongzhen also had some objective reasons. He was in a huge crisis as soon as he came to power, and his personality was distorted and his governance was harsh, and there is also a saying. But Xi Jinping is not like this. His cleansing of the military in recent years has almost caught up with Chongzhen. But the internal and external environments are actually not as dangerous as Chongzhen’s, and it is entirely his own doing. All dictators end up like this. He is completely unaware and does not dare to admit that the root of the disease is on himself. In order to maintain his own authority, he can only prescribe medicine through continuous cleansing and killing.
Before the rumor of the fall of Minister of National Defense Dong Jun, there was actually a rumor not long ago that Xi Jinping had begun to cleanse his “Fujian Gang” in the military. I said earlier that Xi Jinping has cultivated six major factions within the Xi family army, and the most important faction is the “Minjiang New Army”, that is, the “Fujian Gang”. In fact, Xi Jinping has not only cultivated the “Fujian Gang” in politics, but he has also cultivated a “Fujian Gang” within the military. For example, Miao Hua, one of the six members of the Central Military Commission, the director of the Political Work Department, and a Navy General, he is from Fuzhou and has been stationed in Fujian for a long time. Xi Jinping met Miao Hua when he was in Fujian, so he vigorously promoted Miao Hua after he came to power. Miao Hua rose all the way up and is a representative figure of the “Fujian Gang” in the military. But recently, it was rumored that he was taken away for investigation on November 9th.
There is also Lin Xiangyang, a native of Fuqing, Fujian, a general of the Army, and the current commander of the Eastern Theater Command. He was once Miao Hua’s subordinate and was also personally promoted by Xi Jinping. It is said that he was also implicated in the investigation this time. Even Liu Zhenli, a member of the Military Commission and the chief of staff of the Joint Staff Department, is also on the list of investigations.
The rumor of Dong Jun’s fall is very likely related to Xi Jinping’s wave of large-scale cleansing within the military. Because in the rumor of Miao Hua’s fall, there was news that Dong Jun was recommended to Xi Jinping by Miao Hua. These rumors are currently impossible to verify, but if they are true, then it can be confirmed that Xi Jinping must feel that his control of the military has gone wrong, and he will not hesitate to slap himself in the face and get rid of the people he has promoted one after another. This is a very similar and very dangerous mentality to the end of the Chongzhen era.
I said in the episode about Peng Liyuan that Xi Jinping chose a singer’s wife to be his supervisor, to review and control the promotion of senior generals, which is destined to be in vain. Not only is Peng Liyuan an outsider, but Xi Jinping himself is also an outsider. He is very good at power struggles, but transplanting this set of struggle philosophy to the management of the military is destined to be a disastrous ending.
Since the Sino-Vietnamese War, the People’s Liberation Army has not fought a war for nearly 40 years. After a long period of peace, corruption and degeneration are inevitable. Everyone becomes an official in order to make money and get rich. If you are making money well, who would want to risk their lives for you for no reason? Such a military, in fact, no matter how you change people, it is impossible to be what Xi Jinping wants. Throw away a rotten apple and replace it with another rotten apple, and you will eventually find that no apple is good. The biggest and most in need of being replaced is the rotten apple, which is Xi Jinping himself.
Okay, thank you for watching today’s Er Ye’s Story, and we’ll see you next time.
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