Free Archive | The Closed Loop of the CCP’s Power Mechanism: How Did the Chinese NPC Deputies Become a “Rubber Stamp”?

Why can’t the people’s true voice be heard in the National People’s Congress, the political decision-making platform in China?

1. Misalignment of Identity: Is it “from the farmers” or “representing the farmers”?

Official data often cites that the proportion of front-line workers and farmers among the current NPC deputies reaches 16.69% to demonstrate their representativeness. However, “representatives from farmers” and “representatives representing the interests of farmers” are completely different concepts.

1. Elite worker and farmer representatives: Many representatives with farmer identities are actually grassroots administrative cadres (such as Guo Fenglian, a deputy-director-level official) or role models within the system.
2. “Symbols” passively elected: Taking Hu Xiaoyan, the first migrant worker representative in 2008, as an example, she learned that she was elected through the news while working in the workshop. This kind of representative “selected” from top to bottom, whose power comes not from the voters but from organizational promotion, naturally finds it difficult to speak out for the grassroots in the game of interests.
3. Compliant political inertia: The famous representative Shen Jilan once publicly stated that she “never voted against.” Under this logic, the duties of NPC deputies are alienated into unconditional obedience to the party’s will, rather than being responsible to the voters.

2. Control of Grassroots Elections: Electoral District Division and Candidate Review

The CCP, through the “Electoral Law” and the “Organization Law”, has constructed a set of rigorous filtering mechanisms in terms of procedures to ensure that independent public opinion cannot enter the system.

1. “Unitization” control of electoral districts

In the direct elections at the county and township levels, China implements the division of electoral districts in parallel with “place of residence” and “production unit”. Setting up electoral districts in the work unit facilitates the leadership to mobilize and exert pressure through administrative power. Under the guise of secret ballots, voters in the unit system often dare not violate the official intentions for fear of their career prospects.

2. Self-granted authority of the “Election Committee”

In county and township elections, the core of power lies in the “Election Committee”. This institution is appointed by the superior NPC Standing Committee and controls the division of electoral districts, the determination of the number of candidates, and the most critical – candidate qualification review.

• Preparation and Preliminary Election: Although the law stipulates that 10 people can jointly nominate a candidate, the Election Committee can eliminate disobedient “independent candidates” (such as Shu Kexin and Yao Lifa) before the formal vote through “preparation and consultation” and “preliminary election” procedures.
• Power Loop: The county NPC Standing Committee forms an election committee to supervise the election of township NPC deputies, and the township deputies then elect the county deputies. This “self-authorization” loop completely eliminates neutrality.

3. Decoupling of Indirect Elections: The Concept of Electoral Districts Disappears

From the county level upwards (cities, provinces, and the National People’s Congress), elections enter the non-direct election stage, and public opinion is further diluted.

1. Arbitrariness of Representative Qualifications: Under the Chinese system, being elected as an NPC deputy at a higher level does not require the identity of a deputy at this level. This allows a large number of senior leaders and specific candidates to be assigned to participate in elections across the country like “paratroopers”.
2. Xi Jinping’s “Random” Electoral Districts: Xi Jinping has been elected in Shanghai, Inner Mongolia, Guangxi, Jiangsu and other places. This approach completely deviates from the interests of the electoral district’s household registration and the local area, and the representatives no longer represent the interests of the voters in a specific area, but rather reflect “the Central Committee of the Party’s emphasis on the border or underdeveloped areas”.

4. Firewall of High-Level Elections: One-Tenth Threshold

At the National People’s Congress level, the right to nominate state leaders is firmly in the hands of the Presidium. Although the law grants the right of joint nomination to the deputies, the threshold is set at one-tenth of the deputies’ joint signature (about 285 people).

In a conference of three thousand people, it is as difficult as ascending to heaven to contact nearly three hundred people to jointly nominate a non-official candidate under strict organizational monitoring. This “firewall” design completely eliminates the possibility of any accidents or “bad people” making waves.

Epilogue

Through the careful design of the five-level electoral system, the CCP has successfully turned the NPC system into a cloak of power. From the administrative intervention of grassroots electoral districts to the “preparation and elimination” in the process of candidate generation, and then to the extremely high joint signature threshold in high-level elections, every checkpoint is filtering out the true public opinion.

In this system, independent individuals like Xu Zhiyong and Yao Lifa, who try to truly fulfill their duties as representatives and supervise the government, often face the outcome of being marginalized or even imprisoned. What is ultimately produced can only be “rubber stamps” that obey the power center.