At the National People’s Congress in 2026, macroeconomics and people’s livelihood became the focus of attention from all sectors of society. Among them, Premier Li Qiang of the State Council announced in the government work report on March 5 that the minimum monthly standard for basic old-age pension for urban and rural residents will be increased by another 20 yuan, from 143 yuan to 163 yuan. However, this slight adjustment once again pushed the survival dilemma faced by China’s 180 million rural elderly people who are receiving pensions to the public’s attention.
‘Livelihood Appeals’ from Deputies and Members of the CPPCC
In response to the current situation of rural pensions, some deputies to the National People’s Congress from the grassroots expressed deep concerns during the two sessions. Tong Liang, the Party Secretary of a village in Liaoning, said in an interview that an income of about 200 yuan per month is completely insufficient to support the lives of farmers after retirement. He also called on the state to introduce policies to appropriately reduce the self-paid burden of farmers in cooperative medical care. Guo Fenglian, the former Party Secretary of Dazhai, also cautiously proposed to the media that the rural pension is only about 200 yuan per month, and some of it still needs to be paid by farmers themselves. Compared with urban employees with higher pensions, “it’s a bit too unfair to farmers.”
The ‘Poverty Line’ and Structural Poverty That Are Difficult to Cross
According to relevant official data, the national average level of the “New Rural Insurance” for Chinese farmers is only 287 yuan per month. Behind this average number, there is also a huge regional gap: the rural pension in Shanghai can reach 1,555 yuan, Beijing is 998 yuan, while Gansu and other places are only 249 yuan. In contrast, the official minimum living allowance (dibao) standard for rural areas is 594 yuan, which means that the pensions of the vast majority of farmers are far below the most basic living allowance line.
Academic research further reveals the severe reality of rural old-age care, showing the characteristics of “the poorer the older” and “women are poorer than men.” With the establishment of modern nuclear families and the disintegration of traditional clan societies, the traditional concept of “raising children to provide for old age” is facing failure in the current rural social structure, leading to a great predicament in rural old-age care.
Institutional Differences and the Unignorable ‘Historical Debt’
Analysis points out that the low level of rural pensions is essentially a serious injustice in the redistribution mechanism. Currently, the national pension insurance system is divided into three major parts: government institutions and public institutions (about 23 million people), urban employees (about 120 million people), and urban and rural residents (about 180 million people). Among them, personnel from government institutions and public institutions not only enjoy a pension replacement rate of 80% to 100%, but also receive a very high proportion of financial subsidies. Taking data as an example, the per capita national financial subsidy received by government institutions and public institutions is 17 times that of urban and rural residents. In 2024, the pension subsidies for government institutions and public institutions exceeded 640 billion yuan, while the subsidies for the large number of urban and rural residents were only 434.5 billion yuan.
Facing the question of “farmers have no self-accumulation and have not paid social security,” historical facts give different answers. For a considerable period in the past, farmers not only participated in a large number of unpaid compulsory labor (such as building water conservancy projects, roads, etc.) as state employees, but also shouldered the public service expenditures that should have been supported by national tax revenue, such as teachers’ salaries and public security, through “three withdrawals and five contributions.” However, the farmer group did not enjoy the treatment of “deemed contribution” (i.e., the state recognizes the unpaid years in the past as paid) like the personnel of government institutions and public institutions, which is regarded as a huge national “historical debt.”
The following is a comparison table of China’s three major pension insurance systems compiled based on the video content, which directly shows the huge differences in pension benefits among different groups:
Comparison Table of China’s Three Major Pension Insurance Systems
| Comparison Dimension | Pension Insurance for Government Institutions and Public Institutions | Pension Insurance for Urban Employees | Urban and Rural Resident Pension Insurance (New Rural Insurance) |
|---|---|---|---|
| Number of Recipients | About 23 million people | About 120 million people | About 180 million people |
| The Essence of Fund Raising | Mainly relies on the national welfare system and huge financial subsidies | Self-accumulation (individuals pay 8%, the unit pays 16%) | Mainly relies on low-level national financial welfare (basic pension) plus personal account accumulation |
| Pension Replacement Rate | 80% – 100% (some people’s salaries do not decrease after retirement) | 40% – 50% | Very low (far below the rural minimum living allowance line of 594 yuan) |
| Pension Level Prediction | Extremely high (some people can reach 8,000 to 10,000 yuan per month) | Relatively high (enjoying regular pension protection) | Extremely low (the national average is only 287 yuan per month, and some areas such as Gansu are only 249 yuan) |
| Per Capita Financial Subsidy | The per capita financial subsidy received from the state is 17 times that of urban and rural residents | About 3,825 yuan per capita in 2023 | Only about 246 yuan per capita in 2023 |
| Total Financial Subsidy in 2024 | 643.9 billion yuan | 80.6 billion yuan | 434.5 billion yuan (covering the largest number of people, but the total subsidy is far less than that of government institutions) |
| ‘Deemed Contribution’ Treatment | Enjoy (the years of unpaid pension insurance in the past are directly recognized by the state) | Relying on long-term actual payment during work | Not enjoyed (the unpaid compulsory labor of farmers in the past at the national level is not included) |
Core Insights Behind the Data:
Through the above comparison, it can be clearly seen that the fundamental reason for the low level of rural pensions is not that the state cannot afford it, but that there is obvious unfairness in the redistribution mechanism.
- Serious Resource Tilt: The group of government institutions and public institutions, with only 23 million people, not only enjoys a globally rare high pension replacement rate (80%-100%), but also occupies a very high proportion of national financial subsidies (as high as 643.9 billion yuan in 2024).
- Historical Debt Ignored: Facing the common misunderstanding of “farmers not paying social security,” in fact, farmers in history have participated in a large number of compulsory labor such as repairing water conservancy and roads as “state employees,” and have also shouldered the public service expenditures that should have been borne by national tax revenue, such as rural teachers’ salaries and public security, through “three withdrawals and five contributions.” However, farmers did not receive the state’s “deemed contribution” treatment like the personnel of government institutions and public institutions. This historical debt was directly transferred to the 180 million rural elderly people today.
- The Gap That Needs to Be Filled: Experts point out that if the annual financial subsidies of more than 600 billion yuan for government institutions and public institutions can be leveled and benefit farmers, or if about 729.5 billion yuan can be allocated from the 2.5% share of the national public financial expenditure (28 trillion yuan), the farmers’ pensions can be directly increased to 500 yuan per month, thereby truly helping these 180 million poor and vulnerable groups to cross the survival red line.
The Way to Break the Situation: Economic and Social Benefits of Raising to 500 Yuan
In order to fundamentally change the predicament of the rural elderly, many scholars and deputies to the National People’s Congress have called for raising the farmers’ pensions to 500 yuan per month (i.e., about 6,000 yuan per year) in the shortest possible time to ensure that they have a good life. To achieve this universal benefit goal, calculations show that an additional financial expenditure of about 729.5 billion yuan is needed each year, which accounts for about 2.5% of the national public financial expenditure of 28 trillion yuan. In addition, some representatives have put forward more cautious alternative solutions: while maintaining a steady increase for people over 60 years old, give priority to raising the pensions of people over 70 years old to 500 yuan. This measure only requires an additional expenditure of 230 billion yuan per year, which has less than 1% impact on the overall finances.
In terms of fund raising, it is suggested that it can be achieved by allocating the equity of state-owned shares, or by drawing a fixed percentage from the tobacco tax to directly subsidize the urban and rural resident pension insurance, and gradually achieve the standard raising in three to five years. Moreover, raising rural pensions can also bring significant “multiplier effects” to boost domestic demand. Because farmers are the poorest group, their marginal propensity to consume is extremely high. For every 1 yuan of subsidy issued, 1.4 yuan of utility can be generated in society, achieving a win-win situation for the country and the people.
In this rising major power, which is called a moderately developed country, the later life of 180 million rural elderly people is not only an economic issue, but also a measure of social fairness. How to listen to the voices of vulnerable groups, fill the institutional gap, and truly implement “people-oriented” will undoubtedly be a major test facing future governance.
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