In the past two days, a somewhat eye-catching and also somewhat shocking piece of news suddenly flooded the media: starting next year, value-added tax will be levied on contraceptive drugs and devices.
The news stated that starting January 1, 2026, sales of contraceptive drugs and devices will be subject to value-added tax in accordance with the law, and will no longer enjoy the preferential policy of exemption from value-added tax. Previously, Article 15 of the “Interim Regulations of the People’s Republic of China on Value-Added Tax” stipulated that “contraceptive drugs and devices” were exempt from value-added tax; however, this item will no longer be included in the items exempt from value-added tax in Article 24 of the “Value-Added Tax Law of the People’s Republic of China” which will come into effect on January 1 next year.
And the result of this will also be very clear: condoms will become more expensive.
Obviously, most people’s interpretation will not be just a change in the price of a commodity, but rather the implicit intention behind it—to increase the cost of contraception and indirectly boost the birth rate.
This symbolic meaning has also encountered considerable backlash on the internet.
To put it bluntly, it’s more of an attitude issue than an economic one.
01
Previously, the reason condoms were exempt from value-added tax was indeed related to the background of family planning.
Some media summarized it this way:
During the tax system reform in 1994, in order to cooperate with the national policy of family planning, contraceptive drugs and devices were included in the scope of exemption from value-added tax. The core was to reduce the cost of contraception to help regulate the population.
Now, the population situation in our country has undergone fundamental changes: in 2024, the natural population growth rate showed a negative growth for the first time, and the total fertility rate has been consistently below the replacement level. Encouraging childbirth has become a key strategic focus of the country.
While removing the tax-exempt clause for contraceptive products, the new “Value-Added Tax Law” adds a tax-exempt policy for “marriage introduction services.” With one subtraction and one addition, it clearly conveys a shift in policy orientation from “controlling population” to “promoting childbirth.”
However, after the “non-exemption,” how much burden will actually be added is not so “significant.” Media outlets quickly came out to reassure the public, as many citizens worry that “contraceptive products will increase significantly in price,” but the actual impact may be far less than expected.
Specifically, for a condom priced at 15 yuan, the new tax burden after taxation is about 1.15 yuan. Even if the full amount is passed on, the price increase is only about 7%; for emergency contraceptive pills at 30 yuan a box, the price increase is about 1.5-3 yuan, and the overall industry increase is expected to be between 5%-10%. For ordinary families, the new related expenses are only 5-10 yuan per month, which basically does not affect daily expenses.
It’s hard to imagine that someone would choose “to have a child” because of saving these “small amounts of money.” Even experts say that it should be regarded as a “symbolic expression.”
To put it bluntly, this is to show an attitude: in order to make you have children, even condoms are being managed.
Of course, whether this attitude will be accepted is a matter of opinion. Just in the past two days, there was a news report that residents in a certain place posted online, claiming that a chat group required mothers of children to report their last menstrual period, which immediately sparked public opinion.
You can understand it as work. But it’s also understandable that people feel a bit strange when things start to target those sensitive areas.
02
In fact, whether or not to add tax may not be that important, because many people don’t use condoms anymore.
According to statistics from the “2024 China Condom Industry Development Report,” domestic all-channel sales fell from 18.786 billion yuan in 2023 to 15.6 billion yuan in 2024, a drop of 17% within a year.
Even some brands have started to go bankrupt. Statistics show that from 2020 to 2024, more than 78,000 condom-related enterprises across the country went bankrupt, with an average of 17,300 being deregistered each year.
Not to mention having children, people these days are not even interested in sex.
In addition, various “related industries” are plummeting. According to reports from Sina Finance, the number of KTVs nationwide decreased from a peak of 150,000 in 2015 to less than 40,000 in the first half of 2024; the flow of customers to nightclubs generally decreased by 70%-80%, and the number of people visiting bars decreased by over 66%.
But this doesn’t mean there is no desire. For example, the sales of adult products have begun to surge. As early as 5 years ago, China’s adult product industry had achieved a counter-trend expansion of 24%; by 2024, the market size of China’s adult products exceeded 200 billion yuan, which is more than 13 times that of the condom market in the same period, accounting for nearly 60% of the global total (366.16 billion yuan).
These seem to fit the model of a low-desire society: a decreasing population, an aging population, and more and more young people losing their ambition and desires. As for the surge in sales of adult products, it’s a little comforting, at least people haven’t lost their instincts. But it also shows that compared to the trouble of finding a partner, “relying on oneself” is more cost-effective.
These issues also show that condoms are actually too far away from the core topic of fertility, and they are far from being the key variable in deciding whether or not to have children. The problem now is that people’s overall social vitality and emotional state are withering, and not having children is just one of the results.
This is hard to force, and it is destined that any overly aggressive measures will encounter backlash. Just take a look at social media platforms, and you’ll understand.
03
In fact, from the perspective of fertility, no matter how much subsidy is given, it is probably difficult to be considered “enough.”
Fertility subsidies in recent years have actually begun to be implemented, and the pace is quite fast. For example, the national level childcare subsidy is 3,600 yuan per child per year, and some local areas are still increasing this standard. For example, Ordos stipulates that three-child families will receive an additional 6,400 yuan from the municipal level, reaching 10,000 yuan.
According to media statistics, as of June 2025, about 95 regions across the country have introduced fertility subsidy policies with different standards, forming a local “birth promotion” competition.
However, looking at the comment section, you also know that some netizens are not buying it. “300 a month, is that enough?” Similar voices are indeed not few.
To be honest, a few thousand yuan a year is really not realistic to fundamentally improve the willingness to have children. Those with children understand that a general-level extracurricular class may cost that much in a month.
The current high cost of raising children does make many subsidies feel like “a drop in the bucket.” There’s nothing that can be done about it. Considering the population size and financial situation, that kind of “fully guaranteed” high-level support is simply impossible.
But this is still meaningful. As mentioned above, this is also an “attitude issue.”
Under the existing financial situation, still willing to take out a sum of money, even if the amount is limited, is itself a demonstration of policy orientation—maybe not enough, but really trying.
This attitude is actually forming a “contract.” The policy is willing to promise a beautiful future, and families therefore gain an expectation of being received and supported. It does not require an immediate decision, but hopes to convey goodwill through continuous release, so that people believe that if they choose to have children, society will not let them bear all the costs alone.
This contract is not written on paper, but is conveyed through policy signals. And this signal needs to be strengthened repeatedly, through continuous investment, so that the public can truly feel a stable expectation: the fertility policy is not a “passing trend,” but a long-term, patient, and continuous “responsibility.”
Conversely, things like the price increase of condoms and asking about menstruation in the group are also a form of signal transmission, and are also establishing a “contract.” It’s just that this kind of contract is more like a reverse one—if you don’t follow expectations, then you have to bear more inconvenience, more costs, and more pressure of being subtly “reminded.”
Of course, policies are diverse, and the methods are always varied. But at the moment, it is more necessary to reach a positive and encouraging consensus: support in all aspects as much as possible, boost a confidence of “moving in the same direction”—to put it bluntly, convey goodwill, and let people, in a voluntary and pleasant situation, quietly close the door.
As for how much effect it can have, it is better to keep a calm attitude, give enough support, respect choices, and at the same time relax a little, give young people some space, and let time give the answer. This atmosphere is, after all, more suitable for “having children.”
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